Most philosophers of time buy one of two metaphysical and semantic package deals. On one, our temporal language is tensed because time is tensed, i.e. everything in time flows from future to present to past. Simple statements of fact are statements of present fact, of what is the case now. Statements of non-present fact, if true at all, have truthmakers, and hence meanings, which include the pastness or futurity of whatever they are about. This is the traditional tensed view of time and its semantics. On the rival, tenseless, view, nothing flows in time, since nothing is in reality ever future, present or past; and statements of temporal fact need not be tensed, i.e. need not imply that what they are about is future, or present, or past. Of course statements can be tensed; but when one is, as when I say that I am typing now, what makes this true is not the tensed fact that my typing is present but the tenseless fact that I am typing as I speak. All truthmakers are tenseless, and the meanings even of tensed statements, while they differ from those of tenseless ones, can all be stated in tenseless terms.
Most philosophers of time buy one of two metaphysical and semantic package deals. On one, our temporal language is tensed because time is tensed, i.e. everything in time flows from future to present to past. Simple statements of fact are statements of present fact, of what is the case now. Statements of non-present fact, if true at all, have truthmakers, and hence meanings, which include the pastness or futurity of whatever they are about. This is the traditional tensed view of time and its semantics. On the rival, tenseless, view, nothing flows in time, since nothing is in reality ever future, present or past; and statements of temporal fact need not be tensed, i.e. need not imply that what they are about is future, or present, or past. Of course statements can be tensed; but when one is, as when I say that I am typing now, what makes this true is not the tensed fact that my typing is present but the tenseless fact that I am typing as I speak. All truthmakers are tenseless, and the meanings even of tensed statements, while they differ from those of tenseless ones, can all be stated in tenseless terms.
Michael Tooley's book argues forcefully and in detail that the dispute between promoters of these two package deals rests on a false dichotomy. On the one hand he shares the tenseless view that all 'states of affairs' (his truthmakers) are tenseless; so that, as he puts it, tensed facts supervene logically on tenseless ones, not the other way round. On the other hand he thinks the world is 'dynamic rather than static' because the number of actual facts increases over time. Thus by defining present facts as the latest facts he can, while admitting only tenseless states of affairs, accept the common tensed view that to become present is to come into existence. This is at first sight an attractive combination of the best features of tensed and tenseless views of time. But Tooley has other reasons also for adopting it. The main one is the close link between causation and time defended in his 1987 book Causation: A Realist Approach. There he argues that the direction of time (the difference between being earlier than something and being later than it) not only depends on the direction of causation (the difference between causing something and being caused by it) but can be defined by it. To this he now adds the claim that the key properties of causation, as a relation between events, can only be satisfied in a dynamic world. In particular, he thinks that the asymmetry of causation, as he defines it, requires 'an ontological asymmetry' between cause and effect which can only obtain in his kind of dynamic world, i.e. one where the past and present exist but the future does not.
There are however less appealing aspects of Tooley's theory, and among his many virtues is his scrupulous exposition and careful defence of these. The most important of them is his theory's need to distinguish the states of affairs that will eventually exist from those that exist 'as of a time', namely those which are no later than that time. With this distinction goes that between propositions being true or false 'at a time' and their being true or false 'simpliciter'. Tooley needs both kinds of truth, whereas his rivals need only one each: tensed theorists who think that only the present (and perhaps the past) exist only need his 'truth at a time', while orthodox tenseless theorists only need his 'truth simpliciter'. Tooley's need to have states of affairs coming to exist also requires him to hold, while accepting most of the special theory of relativity, that 'events in our world do stand in relations of absolute simultaneity'. This he argues can be so provided spacetime is absolute, i.e. is not 'reducible to spatio-temporal relations between events', and the special theory is, among other things, weakened to require light only to have an invariant average round-trip speed, not an invariant one-way speed.
These consequences, however unorthodox, must of course be taken as part of Tooley's whole theory. Provided they entail no contradiction, we should not reject them just because we can think of intuitively plausible counter-examples: we must resist the common but pernicious practice of, as a colleague once put it, 'wallowing in a featherbed of intuitions'. Nor should we dismiss Tooley's proposed modification to the special theory of relativity because he argues for it on metaphysical rather than physical grounds. Too many philosophers still connive with the self-serving positivism that makes most physicists deny any metaphysical constraints on physical theory, and Tooley's robust rejection of that sycophantic attitude toward physics is very welcome.
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, Tooley's is a better package deal than those of his rivals: does it provide a better account of the metaphysics and semantics of time? As one of his rivals, I naturally think it does not, although that is not just prejudice: a recently completed revision of my own theory included a lengthy study of an earlier draft of this book. But although it contains much that I agree with-its denial of tensed states of affairs, its use of causation to give time a direction-I remain unpersuaded of its key theses. While I cannot argue against them in detail here, I can at least sketch the main reasons for my disagreement.
First, while I fully endorse Tooley's contention that any theory of time, and especially of time's direction, must explain its link with causation, I deny that doing so entails accepting his dynamic world. That there is an ontological asymmetry between causes and affect is true: causes make their effects exist, but not vice versa. But for this asymmetry Tooley's dynamic world is neither sufficient nor necessary. Suppose for example that a fact C causes a later fact E. Then what Tooley's flow of time does, regardless of causation, is bring either E of ~E into existence. (By this I simply mean that either E comes to exist or it does not.) What C does, if the causation here is deterministic, is ensure that it is E rather than ~E which comes to exist. Thus the ontological asymmetry of causation lies not in the flow of time but in the fact that any world with truthmakers for the causal counter-factuals 'if C then (certainly) E' and 'if -C then (certainly) ~E' will lack them for the counter-factuals 'if E then C' and 'if ~E then ~C'. Why this should be so is one of several points at which Tooley and I disagree about causation; without arguing my corner in detail, all I can do here is assert that this asymmetry does not, as Tooley claims, require effects to come into existence. I therefore do not accept his main reason for holding that anything does.
I also disagree with Tooley's claim that his dynamic world is immune to McTaggart's arguments against such worlds. What after all does it mean to say that a tenseless state of affairs S-e.g. that a particular event e occurs, at a tenseless time t e -exists at one time t and not at another? For Tooley it cannot mean that t is e's (and hence S's) temporal location t e , since for him e and S exist at all t > t e . What then can he mean by 'e exists at t'? He cannot mean that, at t, e exists now, or in the past, since these are tensed locations in which he does not believe. Nor can existence be for him an intrinsic property, like an object's shape, which e can have at some times and lack at others. For to have an intrinsic property at any time, an object must at least be located at that time. But then e's existing at times t later than t e cannot be such a property, since e is not at those later times to have that property.
Nor can existence be the sort of property, like being famous, which e can have or lack before or after t e. For these are not really properties ofin the sense of constituents of truthmaking states of affairs containingthe entities we ascribe them to. What makes 'e is famous at t' true for any t is, roughly, that many people at t think about e, and these are states of affairs which contain those people, but not e. This is what enables e to be famous without ever existing, like Sherlock Holmes's move into 221b Baker Street. But existence is not like this: states of affairs containing entities other than e and t will not make 'e exists at t' true if states of affairs containing e and t do not.
Yet how can states of affairs containing t affect the truth value of 'e exists at t' if, as we have agreed, this does not mean that t is e's temporal location? If it did mean that, it would be like 'e exists at s', which is true just when s is e's spatial location s e ; and if it does not, then t is no more relevant to e's existence than s is. The only relevant existential proposition here is the temporally unqualified 'e exists', whose truthmaker is simply e itself. So if, as Tooley says, e both exists (at and after t e ) and does not exist (before t e ), then-McTaggart would say-'e exists' must be both true and false, which is a contradiction.
To this of course the initial riposte is as obvious as that to McTaggart's argument against tensed states of affairs. Here the riposte is that Tooley's tenseless 'e exists' is not both true and false at the same time. It is true at and after t e , when e exists, and false before t e , when e does not exist, and there is no contradiction in that.
To see the reply to this riposte we must ask what gives tokens of a tenseless 'e exists' their truth values. Suppose that 'just before t e I say 'e exists', meaning this tenselessly, and call this token of that proposition a. Then if what makes this proposition and its tokens true is e itself, a must change its truth value from false to true at t e , when e comes into exis-tence. But once we distinguish propositions from their tokens, we can see that this must be wrong, even on Tooley's theory. For as the truth value of any token x of any proposition 'P' must be the truth value 'P' has for whomever produces x when and where they do so, to say before e that e exists, when it does not, is to produce a token of 'e exists' which is not, and never will be, true.
Or is it? The arguments which I take to show that a cannot become true do not show that it is not true. On the contrary. For what a, like all tokens of 'e exists', says, with no temporal qualification, is that e exists. But then the fact that e does exist, at some time or other, must suffice to make the tenseless proposition that says so true at all times. And this in turn makes a and all other tokens of 'e exists' true, whatever their temporal location. But this means that it is a fact at all times that e exists, and similarly for all other events and the tenseless states of affairs which contain them: their number never changes. The universe may be expanding in the sense of being larger at later times than it is at earlier times; but it is not, as Tooley claims, growing by the continual coming into existence of tenseless states of affairs. Which is not to deny that all those who follow Tooley's formidable and largely original arguments, whether or not they agree with them, will grow greatly in their understanding of time. On the contrary, no one can now hope to make a serious contribution to the philosophy of time who has not first read, marked, learned and inwardly digested the contents of this splendid book.
D. H. Mellor
Feyerabend-Philosophy, Science and Society By John Preston Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, xii + 234 pp.
Feyerabend's work has always provoked controversy and drawn both hostile and friendly fire. Many of these reactions were collected in a volume of critical essays, published by Hans Peter Duerr in the early eighties.' 1 John Preston's book is said to be the first comprehensive critical study of Feyerabend's work. Amongst the leading twentieth century philosophers of science, Paul Feyerabend stands out for reasons, which may not be altogether salutary to his work and reputation. Together with Popper, he is probably the best-known philosopher of science outside the field of philosophy. He is notorious for his slogan 'anything goes', which for most people indicates some uncompromising relativist attitude and sums up his philosophy of science. Preston's book corrects some of these impressions. Readers of Feyerabend will also remember his irreverent attitude to both science and the culture of expert consultation. Towards the end of his book, Preston adds a further feature to the image of Paul Feyerabend which may have a decisive influence on the way his work will be read and interpreted in the future: 'Feyerabend was not a careful 1 Hans Peter Duerr (Ed.), Versuchungen: Aufsätze zur Philosophie Paul Feyerabends, 2 volumes, (Frankfurt a./M.: Suhrkamp 1980 Suhrkamp , 1981 .
thinker ' (p. 209) . Preston shows that Feyerabend's work bristles with often inconsistent indications of possible tangents-from radical to reasonable views-along which a more coherent interpretation of his work could be constructed. There is a Feyerabend for every taste and occasion: he is the agent provocateur, the Shakespearean Fool and the gifted charlatan all rolled into one. Preston diligently records all these different moods, choosing a chronological, critical running commentary to write this intellectual biography of Feyerabend. The book does not set out to reconstruct a coherent view from Feyerabend's work, which could be compared with, say, the views of Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn and assessed against some comprehensive episodes from the history of science. Perhaps too many tangents would have to be neglected for the sake of coherence. For instance, after having devoted almost a whole book (Science in a Free Society) to the defence of his brand of relativism, Feyerabend, in his autobiography, offers 'a general recantation of relativism' (p. 209). Preston chooses a tit-for-tat account of Feyerabend's ideas in which his views and arguments are criticized or rebutted on a point-by-point basis. The effect, at least on this reviewer, is an iconoclastic portrayal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. In a revealing footnote, Preston reduces Feyerabend's contribution to the historical philosophy of science to a modest size:
Those who think of Feyerabend as a member of the historical school of philosophers of science might like to consider that nowhere in the (more than ten) papers in which he discusses the case of Brownian motion does he give anything like as detailed a sketch as the one I have just given. Considering that this example is the main illustration of the central argument in the first phase of his philosophy, this is somewhat disappointing. It must also be said that Feyerabend's grasp on the history of the case is weak (p. 218 Fn 5).
Of course there are Feyerabend's case studies of quantum mechanics, carried out in the fifties, and his extended discussion of Galileo and Copernicanism in Against Method, both of which Preston declines to discuss (pp. xi, 173).
In his chronological account, Preston distinguishes two phases of Feyerabend's work (p. 7). Phase I covers Feyerabend's output from his first publication (on Wittgenstein in 1955) to the early seventies; phase II covers the period up to the nineties, including, of course, the notorious books which brought him to the attention of the general public: Against Method ( 1 1975, 3 1993) and Science in a Free Society (1978) . Although there is no clear-cut date at which Feyerabend makes the transition, the two phases are nevertheless distinguished by incompatible features.
Phase I is marked by a belief in a normative epistemology, a peculiar brand of realism and a rejection of relativism. Phase II features an anthropological approach to science, elements of constructivism and relativism amongst rival traditions.
In his first phase, Feyerabend embraced a Popperian normative epistemology of science, which spelled out the methodological rules, which sci-entists should follow. While this was one of the 'central roots of his early philosophy', another important root was his interest in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which resulted in a contextual theory of meaning. From these sources sprang Feyerabend's idiosyncratic version of realism which amounts to the claim that the 'interpretation of an observation language is determined by the theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those theories change ' (p. 30) . This claim lays the foundation to the famous thesis of incommensurability, to which Preston devotes a whole chapter. As Feyerabend was still committed to a single scientific method and anti-relativism at this stage, Preston is eager to dispel the usual impression that Feyerabendian incommensurability involved relativism (p. 122). Theories may not share common meanings but they can be compared. Kuhn held similar views and sought support in Planck's remark that new viewpoints in science establish themselves only when the old generation has died out. But in the very same paper Planck also writes that 'the scientific value of precise experiments is independent of their theoretical interpretation.' 2 Feyerabend did not grant experiments and observations such an independent status but rather pursued what Preston rightly calls 'the most radical and corrosive idea' of the manufactured character of evidence (p. 45). This idea reappears in phase II, but it seems to be linked here to holism about theories-experimental findings can be reinterpreted or explained away-rather than to constructivism, as in the later phase. In the following chapters, Preston characterizes Feyerabend's objections against theoretical monism-the idea that only one theory at a time explains the facts accurately-and works out nicely his arguments for theoretical pluralism. His greatest fear was the 'myth predicament'-the claim that presumably well established theories have a tendency to become unquestioned dogma. His crucial thesis was 'that there exist refuting instances of a theory T which can only be identified through developing alternatives to T' (p. 132). In these pages Preston stresses the essential weakness of an unrestricted principle of proliferation and its negative effect on realism.
After a chapter on Materialism and the Mind-Body problem, the book reaches phase II, the era of anything goes and methodological pluralism. Continuing his running critical commentary, Preston observes that anything goes does not mean the 'absence but rather the research-immanence of methodological rules' (p. 172). The scientist should no longer follow precise methodological rules, as in phase I, but embrace a methodological opportunism' which leads to Feyerabend's cherished idea that great science makes progress by flouting the rules. The inevitable principle of incommensurability rears its head but with a somewhat different meaning-Feyerabend now embraces the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis-and it is offered as a fact about the history of science and art. holism, but in connection with some form of constructivism which defends the historico-physiological character of the evidence (Against Method, p. 67). More than factual elements enter the evidence, says Feyerabend, it is also tinged with subjective and mythical components. Relativism is never far away from such a cluster of ideas but it is not the rampant relativism with which Feyerabend's views have sometimes been identified. It is a relativism of traditions within which there are objective standards and it is a plea for free educational access to all available traditions. There is also a definite move away from the normative epistemology of the first phase, and the recommendation that the anthropological method should be used in the study of science. Such an immersion into a 'remote' culture also lies at the root of some recent work by sociologists of science, 3 but it is difficult to see how faithfulness to Galileo's words and deeds could have produced the rhetorical chapters in Against Method, in which Feyerabend tries to show that in his discussions with the Aristotelians Galileo was engaged in coercion and propaganda rather than rational argument.
Feyerabend was not a historian of science of the calibre of T. S. Kuhn. And the clue to Feyerabend's work may lie elsewhere. He was interested in the skeletons in the cupboard of science. He was an iconoclast of the prestige of science in twentieth century society. He wanted to throw a bit of mud at the ideal picture of scientific rationality. With his later insistence on the importance of the actual study of scientific practice, he anticipated some of the theses which were to become popular among sociologists of science. Perhaps Feyerabend was the best sociologist of science philosophy has ever produced. He also entertained a political vision: the keywords in Science in a Free Society are humanism, freedom and tolerance.
Preston leaves the readers to make up their own minds about the stature of Paul Feyerabend. His critical commentaries provide many intelligent comments on the viability of Feyerabend's ideas. There are also numerous references to the technical literature from which readers can glean more detailed points. 4 This book largely gives an internal account of the development of Feyerabend's views; no detailed assessment of Feyerabend's importance in a larger context is attempted. (Reidel, 1978, pp. 143-180) and 'Dialogue on Method', in: The Structure and Development of Science, G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (Eds) (Reidel, 1979, pp. 63-132) and several pieces published in German (see Duerr, Vol. 2, p. 384 in Fn 1).
is a perfunctory reference to the liberating effect of Feyerabend's thought (p. xi) and to his search for a 'general account of human knowledge ' (p. 209) . But the reader quickly learns that it is a 'myth' that Feyerabend, from the beginning, belonged to the new breed of historically oriented philosophers of science (p. 6). Only in one place does Preston hint at a possible influence of Feyerabend's work. Commenting on the move in the philosophy of science towards historical case studies and the increasing concern with the actual history and practice of scientific disciplines, Preston writes that it 'would be nice to think that this is partly due to Feyerabend's influence ' (p. 176) . In view of the undoubtedly decisive influence of Kuhn, as well as Toulmin, Hanson and Polanyi, Preston's book regrettably does nothing to substantiate this hint.
As Preston points out, many of Feyerabend's arguments were defective and many of his views untenable. Other philosophers, like Popper and Kuhn, with whom Feyerabend tends to be ranked, did of course modify their views over time. But none of them underwent so many radical changes and risked so many incoherent lines of arguments as Feyerabend. There is, however, one coherent theme in his writings, stretching across the two phases: this is his concern for the progress of knowledge and human freedom, and his inveterate suspicion of all authorities, either in the form of scientific experts or systems. Science, he felt, used to be a liberating force when other ideologies were still competing with it, but the twentieth century has turned it into a tyrannical power (Science in a Free Society, pp. 75-6). In such a situation it takes a Shakespearean Fool to hold up the mirror and point to what is on the other side. A bit of polemics enters, context of discovery and context of justification blend into one. Science is not the stoic statue posing on a pedestal in the park. How can we find the skeletons in the cupboard of science? Feyerabend has the answer: 'we need a dreamworld in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit.' (Against Method, p. 32, italics in original). Feyerabend has done more than every other philosopher of his generation to provide this dream world. From such a perspective, presuppositions and weaknesses, as for instance in Galileo's use of the telescope in his defence of Copernicanism, come within reach for the iconoclast. Social facts about the context of discovery are unearthed. The dream world helps indeed to make important sociological discoveries about the real world of science. But Feyerabend's basic error, like that of other proponents of the sociology of science, was to submit the question of the cognitive adequacy of scientific ideas to the question of social acceptance. Preston's book chronicles the tortuous path, which the argument took. It fell ultimately short of its own goal-the study of the actual practice of science.
Friedel Weinert

Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought
By John Gray Oxford and Malden, Mass., Polity Press, 1997, xi + 212 pp. £45, £12.95.
If the author of Endgames is to be believed, those of us still around to greet the new millennium will have enjoyed the dubious privilege of having been born into times that could not possibly have been made more interesting. The seemingly unstoppable global march of capital ravages local cultures and economies abroad, having previously decimated whatever remained of community and security at home. The collapse of the Soviet Union has increased rather than reduced the risk of nuclear conflagration, the Cold War having given way to an ever more anarchic world-order in which long-buried ethnic and religious animosities resurface and together with newly emergent Mafias challenge the supremacy of nation-states to control the use of deadly force, including, sooner or later, the weapons of mass destruction. If a nuclear holocaust is averted, the no less daunting prospect still faces us of ecological catastrophe induced by the environmental damage wrought by the hyper-industrialized forms of agriculture that are needed to feed the ever-burgeoning numbers who crowd into life-boat earth. Not a pretty picture, the reader will surely agree. But have we been truly as accursed as Gray suggests? Didn't the collapse of the Soviet Union turn back the hand of the Domesday clock, as the two former sworn ideological enemies ceased targeting nuclear missiles on each other? Have not agricultural improvements reduced rather than increased the incidence of famine? Doesn't the end of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse of communism presage a global convergence towards liberal democracy, albeit not without many a few hurdles still to be overcome? In sum, are we not witnessing the end of history of which, as Fukayama reminded us, Hegel long ago foretold?
Our author will hear none of it. If, in Gray's view, present times are interesting, indeed, hair-raisingly so, the political thought of the present could not be less so to him, or less comprehending of and relevant to our present circumstances. Hence, the title of the book the aim of which is to plot what its author calls the end-games of the various main contemporary political ideologies. None escapes his fiercely critical gaze.
Gray's greatest ire is reserved for the neo-liberalism which, in an earlier incarnation, he once espoused. During the Thatcherite years in which this ideology acquired ascendancy within the Tory party, its blinkered enthusiasm for untrammelled markets is claimed to have inflicted untold and irreversible damage upon the social fabric of the country. It is said to have brought immiseration and social exclusion to the most vulnerable social groups as well as job-insecurity to middle class voters. It was they who originally brought the Tories to power and it will be their disaffection with what has been done to them, Gray gleefully and, as it has turned out, not incorrectly predicts, that will dispatch the Tories from office and send them into the political wilderness from whence, predicts Gray more speculatively this time, they shall never return.
Through having abolished exchange controls whilst in office, however, the Tories have provided capital with sufficient mobility to ensure there can be no return to the social democracy which enjoyed bipartisan support before 1979. The ability of capital to flee instantaneously from any country which threatens it severely restricts the ability of national governments today, not only to reduce cyclical and structural unemployment by means of Keynesian macro-economic demand management, but also to increase tax rates to ameliorate significantly the ill-effects of unemployment and exclusion. Social democracy no longer represents a live option for us any more than does importing some version of the German social market whose own viability is being steadily eroded by the same present world-wide mobility of international capital.
John Rawls' theory of justice is dismissed as altogether devoid of political relevance. And a similar verdict is delivered by Gray upon the suggestion of former Marxists, such as John Roemer, that the traditional egalitarian aspirations of socialism are capable of being achieved within market economies through governmental corrections of the distributional outcomes of market transactions.
Gray gives equally short shrift to most current communitarian thinking. That of the right is deemed atavistic in yearning after a revival of traditional forms of community such as the traditional two-parent family. That particular institution is said to have become terminally enfeebled through the combined demand for a high degree of labour mobility imposed by modern capital, and for a high degree of autonomy in sexual morality and personal life-style demanded by all who have been touched by modernity. Current communitarian thought of the left is deemed no less atavistic in pinning its hopes for social renewal on the work-place. For the fast pace of technological change has eliminated the possibility of jobs for life in the case of practically everyone and jobs for any part of their lives in the case of the least skilled.
Even those whose ideas Gray has only just recently been extolling, such as Richard Rorty, Michael Oakeshott, and, above all, Isaiah Berlin, are held unequal to the task of being able to track what is currently transpiring on the world stage. Each is deemed to have succumbed to the perennial fault of all philosophical thought since the Enlightenment, namely, having over-valued western ideas and ideals in supposing them to have a greater provenance and saliency than they truly do. Even Rorty is charged with ethnocentrism in asserting the culture of human rights morally superior to other cultures (p.57).
How, if at all, does our author suppose we might be able to stave off impending disaster, nuclear and ecological, and make political thought more germane to our contemporary predicament? Gray's policy prescriptions at the level of national politics bear an uncanny, and possibly not accidental, resemblance to those which Tony Blair's New Labour administration has announced to be informing its current review and reform of the welfare state. We must embrace the project, Gray tells us, 'of reforming the central institutions of the free market so that they are friendlier to vital human needs for security and autonomy. It means preventing social exclusion by enabling all to participate in the productive economy. It means developing institutions, countervailing or complementary to those of the market which foster common life where the workings of markets risk further exclusion. It is concerned with contriving such a common framework of institutions with which diverse communities can live, not with any ideal of a single, all-embracing community' (81).
Our prospects for averting disaster at the international level seem less sanguine, in so far as the prescribed remedies are acknowledged to be harder to accomplish in practice. The general objective here must be that 'of crafting institutions in which we can live in a stable balance with other cultures, with other species and with the earth itself' (p. 178). To accomplish it, a radical over-haul of both the nation-state and the market is needed. We are in need of replacing the present nation-states with what Gray calls post-modern states which can more easily accommodate 'many cultural traditions and communities, ...not unified by the modern artefacts of a national culture or a common ideology, and in [which] local and regional allegiances and supranational institutions have to a significant extent displaced the exclusive loyalties of a nation-state' (180). Gray discerns signs of one potentially successful post-modern state in process of gestation in Europe, provided it escapes the folly of embarking on the hazardous and ultimately unworkable enterprise of creating a federal Europe modelled on the German social market. More formidable still is the task of setting limits to globalization through bringing the market to heel by means of imposing restrictions upon international trade.
Beyond these lies the still more formidable pair of challenges: first, to bring technology under international control, in both its military and non-military guises, and, second, to curb population growth. As illustrations of the kinds of international action that could be taken here, Gray cites 'dismantl[ing] the crumbling civilian nuclear power programme of the post-communist countries' (184) and 'aid to those ... countries implementing serious population control policies, such as China and Egypt' (185).
Gray is decidedly more reticent, because seemingly less sure of the answers, in spelling out how political theorizing can be made more relevant to our post-modern condition. All he is prepared to state on this score is that political thought needs to undergo radical change to become more serviceable to us in the future. Gray ends his book by suggesting that, in order for progress to be made in this domain, we should drop the pretence that currently we have any adequate understanding of ourselves or of an appropriate political ethic. It is thus upon the following highly gnomic note that Gray ends his book. 'One of the principal conceits of the modern period has been the overvaluation of what taking thought can do for human life. .... [T] he idea of humans as thinking beings remains, perhaps, the chief obstacle to thinking in our age. It embodies what must first of all be given up if we are to begin to think, which is the certainty that we know already what we are and how we to live.... The preparatory thinking that is most needed in our time is that which is ready to put our certainty in question' (186).
What are we to make of Gray's account of the various ills which currently beset our political theorizing and practice and his prescriptions for remedying the ills he has identified? Gray is never less than always very interesting and thought-provoking in all that he writes. At the risk of offending his current anti-market sensibilities, Gray is simply streets ahead of the competition in terms of both the sheer brilliance and verve of his writings. Moreover, on occasion, he offers highly acute insights, such as, for example, calling in the name of greater social equality for a reinstatement of selectivity in state schooling (p. 148). All this being said, Gray's current philosophical position is not without much that is open to question. In conclusion, I mention several respects in which his current position might be challenged.
First, Gray provides no real evidence for supposing our prospects, as well as those of the other life-forms with whom we share the planet, any more bleak now than they were during the Cold War, either in terms of risk of nuclear war or ecological catastrophe. Second, he provides no real evidence for supposing modern markets inherently incompatible with either strong forms of communal association or social security, at home or abroad. Third, Gray has not demonstrated the Blair administration incapable of giving social democracy, in some suitably modernized form, a strong run for its-or should I say our?-money, at least in the medium term. Nor, fourthly, has Gray shown why a reunited Tory party might not be capable in medium term-future of staging a come-back in either a neo-liberal or one-nation form. Fifth, he provides no real reason for supposing the liberal democratic nation state incapable of harbouring within it in relative peace and harmony a wide diversity of cultural traditions and forms of life. Despite the periodic eruption of conflagrations signifying the continued room for improvement on this score, the historical record of both the USA and UK this century in accommodating social diversity without civil unrest and violence has been, comparatively speaking, not bad at all.
More fundamentally still, Gray takes for granted that we currently stand at the the end of modernity and the demise of the Enlightenment project of building a universal civilization founded on the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, something which is open to doubt. Nowhere does Gray address, let alone answer, the central question raised by his book which is that of how distinct periods of human history are best to be individuated. Why should we suppose ourselves to be living in late modernity, rather than at the end of early modernity? After all, the Middle Ages are generally supposed to have lasted eight centuries, whilst, on even the most generous estimates, modernity has only been going so far for half that time. If we extend our time-horizon, other perspectives on the present open up beyond the rather apocalyptic vision which Gray offers us. In particular, Gray's attempt to write the obituary of the Enlightenment ideal of a universal civilization grounded upon some posited set of universal rights can come to seem decidedly premature. As Gray himself points out, the closest historical parallel to our present world-historic circumstance is the collapse of the newly Christianized Roman Empire under the onslaught of barbarian forces. Writing at the time, St. Augustine did not despair or view the collapse as signifying the demise of Christianity. Rather, he viewed the collapse as the harbinger of the eventual triumph of Christianity. Not only does St. Augustine's perspective remain as applicable to our times as it was to his, there is a further distinct parallel between his decidedly pre-modern ideal of the City of God and the more secularized variants of the same universal ideal that became espoused in and from the Enlightenment and by which, Gray claims, all current political thought is contaminated. Through himself remaining resolutely naturalistic in philosophical outlook, Gray's own perspective is arguably open to the very same accusation.
In sum, contrary to what Gray would have us suppose, none of the big players of political theory, the more ancient as well as the more recent, is in any imminent danger of being forced to throw in their hands. With the exception of only one who recently vacated the table, all can be considered as still having everything left to play for.
David Conway
Social Reality By Finn Collin London and New York: Routledge, 1997, xiii+252 pp. $19.95/£14.99.
In the last few decades there has been a surge of critical discussions in the philosophy of social sciences. Searching for standards of exactness, clarity, and validity, the social sciences are rethinking themselves in order to better secure a methodological rigour with analytical foundations. Another concern has been the nature of social reality itself, because it is the sum of objects to which the social sciences turn their attention, just as the natural sciences examine physical reality. Central to this discussion has been the thesis of the social construction of reality, the argument that human agents in their purposive actions 'generate' the social world. A number of different philosophical approaches take up and defend constructivism in this sense, from idealism to linguistic relativity. In his new book, Social Reality, Finn Collin surveys these various approaches, assesses them in turn, and offers an alternative account that hopes to avoid some of their methodological mistakes and unacceptable outcomes. Collin's book is a nice attempt to find a middle-ground in the constructivism debate that is instructive for both philosophers and social scientists. To those philosophers generally, he hopes to demonstrate that the separation between thought and reality-and the traditional problem of the independence of that reality from thought-takes on different forms. To social scientists, he hopes to demonstrate that science is not strictly empirical inquiry, and 'is always inextricably intertwined with conceptual issues of the kind that, when treated in a sustained fashion, we may refer to as "philosophical"' (19). In addition, the book is in the Routledge 'Problems of Philosophy' series, so it provides a thorough dis-cussion of the debate for students and non-specialists.
After a thorough introduction which defines some preliminary tasks and establishes some of the contours of the constructivist debate, the book is divided into two parts followed by a brief conclusion in the third part. Part One takes up the Broad Arguments of the constructivist position, the second examines more successful attempts at accounting for the social construction thesis (called the Narrow Arguments), and the conclusion considers the methodological implications of the debate. I shall briefly summarize each of the three parts, painting broad strokes so that the whole picture of Collin's book might be best represented. I shall focus a little more attention in the second part on the contribution of the Narrow Arguments to the moderate constructivism that Collin calls the 'construction by composition' thesis.
I
According to the author, 'The aim of the present book is to interpret, analyse, and evaluate the view that human thought, discourse, agreement, or concepts generate the social world in a non-causal sense' (3). This aim is narrow because Collin is concerned with the generation of social reality, where something 'counts as social if it involves a plurality of human agents whose actions or plans are somehow mutually related' (5). Given these constraints, he proceeds to reconstruct arguments for the social construction thesis, discarding eliminable ones, and offering new ones in support of the best possible version available.
In Part One, Collin examines what he calls the Broad Arguments, or arguments which parallel the idealist theme that human thought constructs reality. Four kinds of arguments are analysed under this group: ethnomethodology, cultural relativity, the sociology of knowledge, and linguistic relativity. Ethnomethodology and cultural relativity claim that social consensus fixes indeterminate terms, thus creating true and false determinate statements which in turn can be applied to the social surroundings. Arguments from cultural relativity, however, hope to avoid a vicious regress in the ethnomethodological account. The regress is this: a communal consensus is itself a social fact which requires some prior consensus to take as its object the new construction of consensus ad infinitum. By relying on standards of rationality that govern communal consensus, cultural relativism hopes to avoid the regress. According to Collin, even if this argument survives the prima facie objection of the assumption of relativism, it ends up being unable to account for transitions in communities where rational standards themselves change (cf. 59-60).
Collin also looks at an important contribution to this debate in the form of Peter Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality. By combining an account of constructivism with the sociology of knowledge, the Berger-Luckmann thesis claims that social reality arises from actually existing habits and thoughts that are fixed as products of other areas of social reality. But as Collin points out, such a thesis 'presupposes that humankind can be exhaustively divided into clearly demarcated social groups, each of these being assigned a distinctive conception of rationality on a pattern of neat one-to-one correspondence' (71). Furthermore, combining a Marxian and phenomenological approach in the sociology of knowledge will not solve the problem of identifying the source of social facts, since 'knowledge structures generate social facts by bestowing certain "meanings" on them' (75). Accordingly, the BergerLuckmann attempt to modify constructivism ends up with the same unacceptable outcome of the arguments from cultural relativity: being unable to account for the socially constructive processes that are themselves socially constructed.
A final Broad Argument is the position of linguistic relativity, that the existence of classification among terms generates social reality. A variety of these kinds of approaches to the social construction thesis are examined, including Thomas Kuhn's treatment of linguistic relativity and the labelling theory of Howard Becker (cf. 84-96) . And the ideas of deviance and classification in the early work of Foucault are briefly considered as an example of this argument (95-6). Collin claims that the overall account of linguistic relativity cannot explain, for example, the shared reaction among agents to a particular thing prior to its fixed determination in a scheme of classification, even though this kind of argument does avoid the regress plaguing the Broad Arguments.
II
Collin rejects these Broad Arguments on the grounds that they obtain unacceptable outcomes which do not accurately reflect the everyday social reality human agents picture. As a result, the Narrow Arguments in Part Two are favoured because they pay close attention to certain features of human agency and action that play prominently in the process of construction. There are three kinds of arguments here: meaningfulness of action (divided into two approaches), symbolism, and conventionalism. These arguments, Collin holds, are on more secure ground than their broad counterparts, because they take the view that social facts must be based on facts associated with individual human beings.
The phenomenological argument and the hermeneutic argument each hold in different respects that the meaningfulness of actions by agents generates social reality. Two other kinds of argument include the symbolic nature of social facts (following Durkheim) and the argument from convention with its roots in the political tradition of social contract theory. None of these accounts of social reality are automatically deferred to by Collin, who criticizes their sometimes too narrow approach. For example, the excessive definition of meaning construed by the phenomenological approach, or the limited nature of symbolic action in the generation of social reality are both considered problematic. The hermeneutic argument is more sophisticated because it assimilates the meaningfulness of language with that of action, and in turn can help to establish a moderate position. Collin claims there is significant empirical evidence that correlates with the hermeneutic arguments of Habermas, which points toward a moderate constructivism in which 'social facts essentially involve human thought (or "meaning") as a component or an aspect, which implies that human thought generates social fact by being a part of it' (219). This is the moderate constructivist position Collin defends.
I shall concentrate on the argument from the meaningfulness of action, because it is here that Collin spends some time examining what he calls 'construction by composition,' the idea that social facts rest on a stratum of facts about individual actions which are a part of that reality. All the Narrow Arguments contribute in one way or another to this outcome, because each is concerned with identifying the meaning involved with language, action, and intentionality. For example, the hermeneutic argument attempts to demonstrate the connection between language and the individual actions upon which social facts rest. As a result, it is a promising route of explanation for construction by composition. Some problems with the Narrow Arguments, however, require modification in order to avoid unacceptable outcomes. The phenomenological approach, while attempting to define the meaningfulness of action, adopts too narrow of a view of 'meaning' (cf. 120-21). Collin recommends ways in which such a psychologistic account can be modified by recasting cognitive contents in prepositional terms, a move which is already closely associated with the hermeneutic approach (127).
In each of the Narrow Arguments, Collin follows this same pattern, reconstructing the argument, pointing out its deficiencies, and recommending modifications that contribute to the thesis of construction by composition. One problem with this procedure concerns the coherence of the moderate constructivism thesis. Because each of these arguments is understood to contribute to it, each modification is determinate in this respect. This has the procedural disadvantage of not being able to compare any given Narrow Argument against the moderate constructivism which requires its modification. As a result, some aspects of the moderate position remain inaccessible for comparison. For example, in what ways does the meaningfulness of action, construed as a part of social reality in the moderate position, account for itself as an object of inquiry? The problem with the Broad Argumentsthat thought generates social reality as its object-is avoided, but so is the question of how meaning-bestowing subjects walk the tightrope between this intentional subjective feature and the objects of social reality that they are as a component of it. A better procedure may be to introduce this 'double-bind' into each of the Narrow Arguments, thereby showing both the strength and weakness of the particular argument in order to assess how moderate constructivism addresses the problem comparatively.
III
The conclusion of the book turns to the original dilemma that underlies the division between the Broad and Narrow Arguments: whether social reality is generated by individuals. A number of methodological concerns are established by Collin, namely, that the Broad Arguments require access to individual thought processes before the facts generated by these processes can be analysed (221). Since these arguments share the premise that social reality is generated by collective thought, they have the disadvantage of being unable to distinguish between social reality and physical reality. The Narrow Arguments, on the other hand, are much more conservative in their claims, according to Collin. By avoiding the 'construction of objectification,' these arguments support the thesis of 'construction by composition' which represents a conjunction between two features: 'human behaviour, described in purely behavioural terms, and certain "meanings" accompanying that behaviour' (223). Contrary to individualist reduction, however, which claims that social reality can be built up from the mental contents of individual agents, Collin argues that the account of social construction he favours is a middle-way between strict versions of the reductionist argument and their excessive counterparts found in holism.
Collin's book is a wide-ranging survey of the efforts by both philosophers and social scientists to provide an adequate account of the construction of social reality. This is an achievement of its own. But added to this is Collin's commitment to provide as a background the history of philosophy and social science in which many of the contemporary arguments are grounded. The combination of these two features, along with a clear language that avoids technical obfuscation, makes Social Reality a contribution to the problem of constructivism specifically and to the philosophy of social sciences generally.
Kory P. Schaff
